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THE INADEQUACIES OF CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO
LEGISLATE FEDERAL FACILITY COMPLIANCE wrrM
ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS
MELINDA R. KASSEN*
INTRODUCTION
The federal government is the nation's largest polluter.' The vast
majority of federal facilities2 that have released contamination into
the environment are defense facilities, owned or operated by the De-
partment of Defense (DOD) or by the Department of Energy (DOE),
the agency responsible for manufacturing and maintaining nuclear
weapons.3 The costs for both environmental "clean up"4 and compli-
ance at federal facilities dwarf environmental spending in the private
sector.5
* Ms. Kassen recently joined Kaiser-Hill Company, L.L.C. as Advisor/Counsel. Be-
cause she drafted this Article prior to joining the company, the views expressed herein are
hers and do not necessarily reflect those of Kaiser-Hill. During the 103rd Congress, Ms.
Kassen served as environmental counsel to the House Armed Services Committee. Be-
tween 1986 and 1993, she was the Chair of the Radiation Program for the Environmental
Defense Fund. During the 1991-92 academic year, she taught administrative and environ-
mental law as a visiting assistant professor at the University of Denver College of Law. She
also held the positions of Assistant Attorney General in Colorado (1983-86) and Deputy
City Attorney in Los Angeles (1981-83). This Article is based, in part, on Ms. Kassen's
personal experiences working with the issues discussed herein.
1. See Kyle Beltiqole, Comment, Defending Against Defense: Civil Resistance, Necessity, and
the United States Military's Toxic Legacy, 21 B.C. ENvrL. A's'. L. REV. 667, 667 (1994)..
2. The term "federal facilities," as used in this Article, corresponds with the definition
in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
§ 120(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a) (2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter CERCLA], which
defines federal facilities as "facilities which are owned or operated by a department, agency
or instrumentality of the United States."
3. Alice Rivlin, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, suggested naming
a draft report on environmental restoration at federal facilities, "The Elephant, the Rabbit
and the Mice," as a way of describing the relative sizes of the tasks at DOE, DOD and all
other federal agencies. Conversation with Thomas P. Grumbly, Assistant Secretary for En-
vironmental Management, United States Department of Energy.
4. Given the magnitude and complexity of the contamination at these facilities, a
complete "clean up" at these sites is not possible. However, because the use of this phrase
has become endemic in this field, it appears throughout this Article.
5. In a 1993 report, Resources for the Future estimated that performing all of the
restoration at the 1000 private sector sites on the National Priorities List under CERCLA
could cost $44 million. KATHERINE PROBSr & PAUL PORTNEY, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE,
ASSIGNING LIAILIT FOR SUPERFUND CLEANUPS (1992). "Environmental clean-up of the
24,000 sites on federal facilities in the United States may ultimately cost as much as $400
billion . . . ." FEDERAL FACILrriES ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION DIALOGUE COMMITTEE, IN-
TERIM REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE FEDERAL FACILrrY ENVIRONMENTAL
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The special nature of federal facilities creates enforcement chal-
lenges for both federal and state regulatory agencies. For the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), enforcing environ-
mental laws at facilities owned or operated by sister agencies raises the
specter of differential treatment or even the inability to enforce EPA
regulations aggressively.6 It has proven largely immaterial that DOD
and DOE budgets are proposed by the same executive branch and
that their activities are overseen by the same Congress as are EPA's.
States, attempting to enforce environmental regulations against fed-
eral facilities, have had to overcome hurdles ranging from claims of
sovereign immunity to claims relating to the secrecy that surrounds
many defense functions. The question whether states can impose
fines and penalties against federal agencies that violate environmental
laws has strained the cooperative federalism that prevails elsewhere in
the environmental arena.
Part I of this Article discusses the reasons why EPA and states have
had difficulty enforcing environmental regulations against federal fa-
cilities. Part I then traces the reasons for and the passage of enforcea-
ble penalty authorities in two hazardous waste statutes, the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 7 and the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). 8
This discussion also reviews briefly the important cases that have con-
sidered these penalty provisions.
Part II reviews the imposition of fines imposed on federal facili-
ties under RCRA and CERCLA, and reviews DOE's and military de-
partments' response to initial notices of violation. Part II also
discusses where DOE and the military departments have found the
money necessary to pay the fines9 and how the recipient state regula-
tory entities have used the money received.
Part III discusses three particularly important lessons learned
from the enforcement experience. First, the imposition of environ-
mental fines is unlikely to serve as an incentive to agency personnel to
comply with its environmental responsibilities because of the manner
RESTORATION DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND SET-ING PRIORITIES IN THE EvENT OF FUNDING
SHORTFALLS (1993).
6. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
7. Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [herein-
after Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA)].
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
9. The data from the field show that the net fines paid by DOE and DOD constitute a
minute percentage of the Departments' overall expenditures for both compliance and res-
toration activities, see infra Part II.A.I, and that the money to pay fines came from the
budget of programs responsible for environmental compliance. See infra Part II.B.
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in which agencies build their budgets and thus find the money to pay
fines. Second, even though the imposition of fines may not serve as
an incentive to comply with environmental regulations, and even
though the fines themselves represent a trivial amount of program
dollars, the formal process required by the statutes does at least give
environmental regulatory agencies enhanced power to compel federal
agencies to respond to legal mandates. Third, a federal agency's suc-
cess in achieving compliance appears to be as much a function of the
personalities of those running the environmental programs at the reg-
ulated agencies as it is a function of the legal mechanisms available.
In conclusion, I suggest that before Congress moves to repeal or
fix the failure of penalty provisions in RCRA and CERCLA to provide
meaningful incentives to federal agencies to comply with environmen-
tal requirements,10 members need to learn two things. First, Congress
must find out what incentives would effectively motivate federal
agency personnel to comply more completely with environmental
laws. Second, Congress must explore how to draft legislation that will
truly take advantage of such incentives. In addition, and most impor-
tantly, the key to federal facility compliance depends on the commit-
ment of the executive and legislative branches to provide the
resources necessary to accomplish the environmental restoration and
waste management tasks that confront federal agencies.
I. THE BASIS FOR, AND PASSAGE OF, RCRA AND CERCLA
ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS AGAINST FEDERAL FACILITIES
A. Shields from Responsibility: Reasons Why Neither EPA nor States
Could Enforce Environmental Requirements Against Federal
Facilities
As Congress pulled federal facilities under EPA's regulatory net, t1
defense agencies faced a series of hurdles in transforming themselves
into entities capable of operating in compliance with environmental
requirements. In particular, defense agencies had to confront, (1) a
view within their own ranks that their operations were above regula-
tory law, (2) a lack of an effective bureaucracy to handle environmen-
tal compliance issues, and (3) a multitude of complex, unique
10. The beginning of this movement shows itself in legislation introduced by Senators
Johnston and Murskowski for the Department of Energy's Hanford Reservation wherein
they would override virtually all of the requirements of CERCLA and RCRA. 141 CONG.
REc. S7620 (daily ed. May 25, 1995).
11. See infra note 54.
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contamination scenarios, some of which presented situations where
compliance would be effectively impossible.
12
At the least, one must give federal polluters, as represented by the
Department of Justice, credit for having come to the battle over envi-
ronment enforcement with a dazzling array of arguments. As Senator
Stafford characterized the federal agencies' stance during the floor
debate on the amendments to Superfund: "No loophole, it seems, is
too small to be found by the federal government."" Federal defenses
have included the need for national security,14 the inability of one
federal agency to sue another, 5 the traditional immunity of the sover-
eign from suit by the states,' 6 and the vagaries of federal budgeting
that preclude the expenditure of money for activities that Congress
has not authorized and for which Congress has not appropriated
funds.' 7 For nuclear weapons complex facilities, defense agencies' ar-
guments focused on the right to self-regulate and self-enforce under
the Atomic Energy Act.'"
1. National Secuity.-For over two centuries, the armed services,
most recently under the Department of Defense, have been entrusted
with the defense of the country. For forty years, the primary mission
of the Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies was to build
nuclear weapons for the national defense. 9 Historically, Congress
has given the agencies responsible for the country's military protec-
tion far greater leeway for complying with applicable laws than other
federal agencies.
20
12. For DOE, these unique situations result mostly from the mixtures of hazardous
with radioactive materials. In some cases, DOE has asserted that there is no current possi-
bility of clean up. See OFFICE OF EwrrL. MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOE/EM-0232,
ESTIMATING THE COLD WAR MORTGAGE: THE 1995 BASELINE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
REPORT ix (1995) [hereinafter BASELINE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT REPORT]. For
DOD, at least some of their unique, and seemingly unsolvable problems derived from the
deposition of unexploded ordnance at training ranges, such as the Jefferson Proving
Ground, Indiana. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 357, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 546 (1993).
13. 132 CONG. REc. S14,903 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986), reprinted in Adam Babich, Does the
Sovereign Have a License to Pollute, 6 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1991, at 28.
14. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 62-79 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2011-2296 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
19. OFFICE OF ENVTL. MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, CLOSING THE CIRCLE ON THE SPLIT-
TING OF THE ATOM 4 (1995).
20. For example, the military has its own legal code and system, its own standards for
due process, MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (1994 ed.), and its own rules
protecting privacy, see, e.g., id., Part IV, para. 83 (criminalizing fraternization among service
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In recognition of the unique conditions under which defense
agencies operate, Congress has consistently recognized the potential
need to exempt certain military activities from compliance with envi-
ronmental laws. Thus, virtually every environmental statute contains a
provision that authorizes the President to exempt an activity from
compliance, if to do so is in the "paramount interest" of the United
States. For example, RCRA provides:
The President may exempt any solid waste management fa-
cility of any department, agency, or instrumentality in the ex-
ecutive branch from compliance with . . . [any RCRA]
requirement if he determines it to be in the paramount in-
terest of the United States to do so .... Any exemption shall
be for a period not in excess of one year, but additional ex-
emptions may be granted for periods not to exceed one year
upon the President's making a new determination. The
President shall report each January to the Congress all ex-
emptions from the requirements of this section granted dur-
ing the preceding calendar year, together with his reason for
granting each such exemption. 1
Unfortunately for the defense agencies, the President has
granted paramount interest exemptions in only a few instances.22
Moreover, when defense agencies have raised "national security" as a
defense in the courts by arguing that forcing them to comply with
environmental regulations would compromise national security, they
have lost because judges have pointed to the presidential exemption
provisions as the only legitimate way for an agency to avoid having to
comply with environmental regulations.
For example, in the first environmental case in which it consid-
ered the paramount interest test, the Supreme Court found that the
Clean Water Act?3 permitted "the exercise of the court's equitable dis-
cretion... to order compliance with the Act."24 The Court noted that
if the district court enjoined DOD from dropping ordnance into Pu-
erto Rican waters without a Clean Water Act permit,25 a practice that
members); MIL. R. EVID. 315 (permitting military commanders to conduct searches); no
other federal agency has such privileges.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a).
22. Administration officials have asserted that the President has granted paramount
interest exemptions less than 10 times, all as a result of natural disasters.
23. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) [hereinafter Clean Water Act].
24. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 318 (1982).
25. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a) ("[T]he discharge of any pollutant by any person
shall be unlawful... [except] the Administrator may... issue a permit for the discharge of
any pollutant .... ).
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DOD claimed was a necessary part of bomber training and thus criti-
cal for maintaining national security, then DOD could apply for a
presidential exemption under that Act.2 6
A decade later, DOE contended that it could not comply with the
Clean Water Act if it were to restart a nuclear reactor to produce tri-
tium, an important element in the production of modem nuclear
weapons.27 DOE argued that it should be allowed to proceed with
tritium production even if doing so would violate the Clean Water Act
because increasing the tritium stockpile was "a critical element of na-
tional security policy."28 The court rejected this contention outright
because, based on the facts, it found that the nation had a sufficient
tritium stockpile' 9 In rejecting DOE's national security argument,
the Fourth Circuit stated that, if DOE could show that "an injunction
blocking the reopening of the.., reactor would seriously compromise
national security interests," then DOE should apply for a presidential
exemption under the Clean Water Act3° because "the Executive
Branch possesses ultimate unilateral authority to prevent any compro-
mise to national security concerns. " 3 1
Because of the Court's position on the paramount interest ex-
emption and because there are only a few instances where the Presi-
dent has granted the exemption, defense agencies have not been able
to use it to shield routine national security activities from compliance
with environmental requirements. Nevertheless, for many years after
the inception of the modem environmental age,' 2 military agencies
have operated without independent regulatory oversight of their activ-
ities that affect the environment. And, because the national security
26. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 319.
27. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 977 (4th Cir.
1992).
28. Id. at 982.
29. Id. at 981-82.
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1323. The President's Executive Order 12,088 sets forth the process
describing how an agency may qualify for a presidential exemption and requires the
agency to submit its request and rationale to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). The EPA Administrator is also required to submit EPA's position to OMB, after
which OMB's Director makes a recommendation to the President. Exec. Order 12,088,
§ 1-7, Limitation on Exemptions, 3 C.F.R. 243 (1979), reprinted in42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
31. Watkins, 954 F.2d at 982.
32. For the purposes of this Article, this era began with the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(d) (1988) and can be characterized by an em-
phasis on enforceable regulation through laws such as the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7 67 1q (1988 & Supp. V 1993), Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, Public
Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter Safe Drink-
ing Water Act], and Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
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hierarchy made few efforts to modify its operations in ways that might
reduce environmental effects, neither DOD nor DOE developed the
internal institutions to facilitate compliance when it finally became
apparent that both would have to comply with environmental laws or
face sanctions. Moreover, both found themselves with huge inven-
tories of facilities that were either out of compliance with, or in need
of, restoration under the relevant statutes."3 Therefore, defense agen-
cies did not solely rely on the paramount interest exemption to shield
their activities from external environmental regulation. Another ex-
ample of how defense agencies tried to use their national security mis-
sion and their lack of internal environmental institutions to shield
them from compliance with environmental laws can be found in the
saga of RCRA permitting at DOE's Rocky Flats Environmental Tech-
nology Site, formerly the Rocky Flats Plant.
Under RCRA, facilities that operate in whole or in part to treat,
store or dispose of hazardous wastes (TSDs), including federal facili-
ties, must obtain a RCRA permit.3 4 EPA's regulations under RCRA
required all TSDs to submit RCRA permit applications.3 5 Rocky
Flats,3 6 where DOE machined and recycled plutonium pits, the core
of a modem nuclear weapon, qualified as a TSD and in 1980 DOE
submitted a RCRA application. 7 However, on its first RCRA applica-
33. Sixteen of DOE's facilities and over 100 defense (Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps) facilities are on the 1200-site National Priorities List of the most contami-
nated sites subject to the restoration requirements of CERCLA. H.R. REP. No. 111, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.CAN. 1287, 1289. The federal govern-
ment has over 24,000 hazardous waste sites. FEDERAL FACILITIES ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORA-
TION DIALOGUE COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at v. For a description of DOE's environmental
restoration and waste management challenges, see RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT DISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-256920, NUCLEAR WASTE: MUCH
EFFORT NEEDED TO MEET FEDERAL FACILITY COMPLIANCE AcT's REQUIREMENTS 1 (1994). For
a perspective on the Department of Defense sites, see SETH SHULMAN, THE THREAT AT
HOME: CONFRONTING THE TOXIC LEGACY OF THE U.S. MILITARY (1992), in which the author
describes the Army's Rocky Mountain Arsenal as the most polluted square mile in the
world. Id. at xi.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 6925.
35. 40 C.F.R. 270.1(b) (1994).
36. Rocky Flats is a 6.550 acre installation in northern Jefferson County, Colorado with
100 buildings and facilities. Affidavit of Special Agent Jon S. Lipsky, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, attach. 3, at 4, In re Search of the Rocky Flats Plant (D. Colo. 1989) (No. 89-
730M) [hereinafter FBI Affidavit]. In the past, Rocky Flats developed and fabricated "nu-
clear weapons components from radioactive and nonradioactive materials." ROCKY FLATS
ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY SITE, SITE ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT 2 (1993). In 1992, the
plant's mission changed and today, the site focuses on "environmental restoration, waste
management, [and] decontamination." Id. Rocky Flats stores hazardous materials on site.
Id. at 3.
37. In re Rocky Flats Plant, Federal Facility Compliance Agreement, Docket No. RCRA
(3008) VII-91-09 3-4 (1991) (on file at Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site).
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tion, 8 DOE claimed that the regulators should treat Rocky Flats as a
"small generator" under RCRA,3 9 meaning a facility that generated
less that one hundred kilograms of hazardous waste a month.40  A
small quantity generator is generally exempt from RCRA require-
ments for each month in which it generates less than one hundred
kilograms of hazardous waste.41 In fact, Rocky Flats was generating
almost 50,000 pounds of halogenated solvent wastes and over 30 mil-
lion pounds of all types of hazardous wastes annually.
42
Eventually, it became clear that the Rocky Flats' managers had
submitted an application for a "small generator" because they deter-
mined that RCRA should not apply if hazardous wastes were mixed
with the fissile radioactive materials used to make weapons compo-
nents. 4' DOE's theory was that, for the purpose of these nuclear
materials, DOE was entitled to self-regulate under the terms of the
Atomic Energy Act. 44 Thus, DOE thought that it did not need to re-
port or submit to regulation any hazardous materials that were mixed
with the radioactive materials subject to DOE's exclusive Atomic En-
ergy Actjurisdiction. Since over ninety percent of the waste at Rocky
Flats was mixed hazardous-radioactive waste, DOE's theory meant that
there would have been very little pure hazardous waste for EPA or
Colorado to regulate under RCRA.
It was not until the State of Colorado threatened to sue DOE in
1984 that DOE began to take seriously its obligation to obtain a RCRA
permit for more of the mixed hazardous-radioactive wastes at Rocky
Flats. In 1989, DOE, EPA and Colorado signed an agreement that
committed DOE to submit a complete permit application for Rocky
38. This application is on file at the Colorado Department of Public Health and Envi-
ronment, Hazardous Materials Division. It is also described in FBI Affidavit, supra note 36.
39. Id. attach. 3, at 31.
40. 40 C.F.R. § 261.5(a) (1994).
41. Id. § 261.5(a)-(j).
42. FBI Affidavit, supra note 36, at 34-35.
43. See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (exempting from RCRA regulation "special nu-
clear, or byproduct material" as defined by the Development and Control of Atomic En-
ergy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2014(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter Atomic Energy Act]).
44. DOE did not propound this theory exclusively at Rocky Flats. In fact, DOE first lost
in court on this theory in Legal Env't Assistance Fund, Inc., v. Hodel, 586 F. Supp. 1163
(E.D. Tenn. 1983), in which the district court ruled that DOE had to comply with RCRA at
its defense facilities, notwithstanding the authority vested in DOE under the Atomic En-
ergy Act. Id. at 1166. Eventually, EPA stepped in and issued a regulation proclaiming that
RCRAjurisdiction extends to the hazardous portion of mixed hazardous-radioactive waste.
51 Fed. Reg. 24,504 (1986). The next year, DOE conceded and amended its own regula-
tions to clarify that its facilities were subject to RCRA authority for the non-radioactive
hazardous portion of mixed wastes. 10 C.F.R. § 962.3 (1994).
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Flats that would cover most of DOE's mixed waste streams.4 5 Even
then, however, DOE balked at including certain high plutonium con-
tent waste streams-called "residues"-on the grounds that they were
"in process." It took a Sierra Club lawsuit against DOE's contract op-
erator to force DOE to allow Colorado to regulate all of its mixed
wastes as hazardous.'
Today, DOE has a voluminous state RCRA permit in hand, as well
as a continual stream of applications to modify that permit to add
additional units and activities at Rocky Flats.47 "RCRA regulates all
activities at [Rocky Flats] .. . associated with hazardous waste and
mixed waste." '  The State still does not regulate pure radioactive
materials or waste.49 It is not yet the case, however, that DOE is in
compliance with its RCRA obligations at Rocky Flats. In fact, the site
has experienced continual problems meeting deadlines for finding
adequate treatment, storage, and disposal of its mixed hazardous
wastes. Notwithstanding this history, it was not until the day after the
FBI raided the Plant in 1989 that Colorado first issued a Notice of
Violation which also sought to impose a monetary penalty on DOE for
its activities at Rocky Flats.5"
2. The Unitary Executive Theoy.-The unitary executive theory,
advanced most vigorously in modem times by President Reagan's De-
45. FBI Affidavit, supra note 36, at 44.
46. Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Energy, 734 F. Supp. 946, 947 (D. Colo. 1990).
Although EPA generally administers the Act, Colorado implements RCRA through its haz-
ardous waste regulations. Id.
47. Colo. Permit No. 91-09-30-01, ID No. C0789001526. Rocky Flats submitted modifi-
cation number 35 in June 1995. (Permit on file with the Colorado Department of Public
Health and Environment) (#303-692-3000).
48. RocKY FLATs ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY SITE, SrrE ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT 34
(1993).
49. Id. Rocky Flats has both plutonium and highly enriched uranium stored at the
plant. While the highly enriched uranium is only stored, the plutonium is in a variety of
forms, including forms that currently require stabilization. The Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board, which Congress created in 1988, has the statutory duty to oversee safety of
the plant's management of pure radioactive waste under the Atomic Energy Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2286d(1)-(5). The Board has no regulatory authority, however, only the ability to make
public recommendations to which the Secretary of Energy must respond. Id.
50. While Colorado never attempted to enjoin operations at Rocky Flats, DOE ulti-
mately paid the state $98,500 in penalties as a result of this Notice of Violation. See Memo-
randum from Randall L. Kaltreider, Dep't of Energy, to Mark Holt, Congressional
Research Service (Mar. 3, 1994) (on file with author). As a result of the FBI raid, the
United States ultimately indicted DOE's management and operations contractor at the
time, Rockwell International. Rockwell entered a plea agreement in 1992 which required
the company to pay $18.5 million for felony and misdemeanor violations of RCRA and the
Clean Water Act. R. Jeffrey Smith, Rockwell Fined over A-Wastes; $18.5 Million Penalty in Rocky
Flats Case Largest of Its Kind, WASH. Pos-r, Mar. 26, 1992, at Al.
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partment of Justice (DOJ), contemplates that all federal agencies
whose leaders serve at the pleasure of the President are part of a sin-
gle branch of government which has a single view on any given public
policy flowing from the President.5" Thus, under the unitary execu-
tive theory, one agency, in this case EPA, cannot logically bring a coer-
cive action-through either a judicial or administrative enforcement
proceeding-against another agency, such as DOD or DOE. Such an
action necessarily requires the two agencies to take opposing positions
with respect to factual or legal issues, something that cannot occur if
both agency executives derive their marching orders from the same
general.5" The solution, according to the proponents of the theory, is
for disputant federal agencies to resolve their differences internally,
usually with the Office of Management and Budget arbitrating.53
While Congress has consistently rejected the legitimacy of the
unitary executive theory by granting EPA the authority to enforce en-
vironmental laws against its sister agencies for noncompliance at fed-
eral facilities, 4  EPA has exercised this authority sparingly.55
Moreover, at least one court5 6 and most states57 have expressed skepti-
51. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Exec-
utive, Plural Judiciay, 105 I-LIv. L. REv. 1153 (1992) (discussing the unitary executive
theory).
52. ROBERT MELTZ, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERvICE, No. 90-390A, ENFORCEMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AT FEDERAL FACILITIES: LEGAL IssuES 3-8 (1990).
53. One can also find the executive branch's preference for OMB to serve as arbiter
between agencies in Exec. Order No. 12,088, 3 C.F.R. 243 (1979), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321 (1988), and Exec. Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409 (1980), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.
§ 509 (1988).
54. See Clean Water Act § 313, 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act
§ 1447, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-6 (1988); Clean Air Act § 118, 42 U.S.C. § 7418 (1988 & Supp. V
1993); RCRA § 6001, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); CERCIA § 120(a) (4), 42
U.S.C. § 6961 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The irony, of course, is that, because courts have
denied states the ability to seek fines against federal agencies by reading these waivers of
sovereign immunity restrictively, see infra Part IA3, when the Department ofJustice refuses
to allow EPA to take an enforcement action on the grounds that the unitary executive
theory bars such action, these statutory sections are effectively rendered nullities.
55. In fact, throughout the 1980s, the Department ofJustice had a policy in place that
barred EPA from litigating against its sister agencies. See Michael Steinberg, Can EPA Sue
Other Federal Agencies?, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 317 (1990). Thus, EPA could only seek agree-
ments with the regulated agencies that they would commit money for Supplemental Envi-
ronmental Projects, see infra Part IIA3, or seek to trigger the stipulated penalty provisions
in interagency agreements under CERCI. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(e).
56. See Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1570 (D. Colo.
1989) ("I conclude that the E.P 's potential monitoring of the Army's Basin F cleanup
operation under CERCLA does not serve as an appropriate or effective check on the
Army's efforts."), rev'd on other grounds sub non. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565
(10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994).
57. See H.R. REP. No. 111, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-12, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.CAN.
1287, 1292-98 (1990) (reprinting statements by state attorneys general and state program
1484
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cism that EPA can regulate federal agencies as vigorously as it regu-
lates private or local government polluters.
3. Sovereign Immunity.-Because of the factors constraining
EPA's enforcement authority over federal facilities, states have as-
serted a more aggressive regulatory posture toward federal facilities.
The federal government's response has been to claim sovereign im-
munity to resist such enforcement. DOE's resistance to Ohio's at-
tempts to enforce RCRA and the Clean Water Act at its Fernald Plant
is one of the best examples of this dynamic.5
Fernald, located at the edge of the Cincinnati metropolitan area,
was the uranium processing center of the U.S. nuclear weapons com-
plex.5 9 Substantial quantities of uranium and nonradioactive hazard-
ous materials from the plant leaked into groundwater and
contaminated soils outside of the plant's boundaries.' Eventually,
nearby residents won seventy-five million dollars for damages to
health and property in a class action. The award also included signifi-
cant health monitoring provisions.6 Operations ceased in the mid-
1980s, so that the only ongoing activities at Fernald for the last decade
have been waste management and remediation.
In 1986, the State of Ohio sued DOE for violations of RCRA and
the Clean Water Act at Fernald; Ohio sought an injunction and sanc-
tions in the form of civil penalties.6" DOE defended by arguing that,
notwithstanding the statutory waivers of sovereign immunity, Ohio was
still barred by sovereign immunity from seeking monetary sanctions.63
The district court considered the waivers of sovereign immunity in
both RCRA6 and the Clean Water Act' and, after finding the waivers
to be sufficient, ruled in Ohio's favor.66 The district court based its
officials advocating the adoption of the Federal Facilities Compliance Act and arguing that
the Act, which would give states enforcement power, is necessary because federal facilities
have been and are "the very worst violators of environmental laws.").
58. The other outstanding example would be the Army's resistance to Colorado's en-
forcement of RCRA at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. See infra notes 182-214 and accompa-
nying text.
59. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1990), rev'd,
112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
60. Id.
61. See In re Fernald Litigation, No. C-1-85-149, 1989 WL 267038, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
29, 1989) (discussing the case).
62. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760, 761 (S.D. Ohio 1988),
affd in part, 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1990).
63. Id. at 761-62.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (a).
65. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
66. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. at 767.
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holding both on the plain language of the statutory provisions and on
the statutes' legislative history.67 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit af-
firmed the judgment of the district court.6" The Sixth Circuit based
its ruling on the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Clean Water
Act 69 and on the citizen suit provision in RCRA.70 DOE appealed
again, and this time, the Supreme Court reversed.7 ' The Court held
that neither the citizen suit provisions nor the provisions that directly
appeared to waive sovereign immunity in RCRA and the Clean Water
Act did so successfully such that states or citizen groups could seek the
imposition of civil penalties as sanctions for a federal agency's viola-
tions of these laws. 72 With regard to RCRA's waiver of sovereign im-
munity,"s the Court concluded that the language subjecting federal
facilities to "all" of RCRA's "requirements" did not include a waiver of
immunity from punitive fines.74 As for the citizen suit provisions,75
the Court concluded that there was no clear and unequivocal waiver
of sovereign immunity for the imposition of fines.76 While both stat-
utes stated: "any person may commence a civil action on his own be-
half against any person (including the United States),"77 the Court
noted that "neither statute defined 'person' to include the United
States."78 The Court then concluded that, because the statutes' defini-
tion of person did not include the United States, Congress had not
waived sovereign immunity with respect to the imposition of civil
penalties. 79
67. Id. at 764-67. The court found that both provisions were written in response to the
Supreme Court's decisions in Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976), and EPA v. Califor-
nia, 426 U.S. 200 (1976). Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. at 762, 766.
68. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1058 (6th Cir. 1990).
69. Id. at 1062.
70. Id. at 1064-65. The citizens suit provision in RCRA provides:
... [Any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf-(1) (A) against
any person [ ]including... the United States... who is alleged to be in violation
of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or or-
der which has become effective pursuant to this Chapter .... Any action under
paragraph (a) (1) of this subsection shall be brought in the district court ....
The district court shall have jurisdiction . . .to enforce the permit, standard,
regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order... and to apply any
appropriate civil penalties under section 6928(a) and (g) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
71. United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
72. Id. at 1640.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (a).
74. United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1639-40.
75. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
76. United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1633-36.
77. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
78. United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1634.
79. See id. at 1635.
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4. How Budgeting Affects Compliance Policy. -- Compliance with en-
vironmental mandates was difficult for the defense agencies in part
because they had never sought the funds necessary to sustain a serious
program for environmental compliance and restoration activities. In
1984, eight years following RCRA's adoption and over a decade after
passage of the Clean Air8 ° and Clean Water Acts,8" both DOD and
DOE had environmental budgets of less than one-half billion dollars
annually. 82 By 1994, their budgets for combined spending had grown
to approximately $11.2 billion," a figure that represents the largest
chunk of environmental spending in the federal budget, with each of
the two defense agencies receiving approximately eighty-five percent
of what Congress appropriated that year for EPA.'
To comply with all laws, regulated entities must budget sufficient
funds to perform the required activities. Executive Order 12,08885 re-
quires the head of each federal agency to request enough money in
the agency's budget to comply with all relevant legal requirements.86
But, because the President builds the Executive Branch budget by hav-
ing OMB meld all of the agencies' requests into a single Executive
Branch proposal, the President's request to Congress may include cuts
in an agency's original budget submission. Thus, even if the head of
an agency complies with Executive Order 12,088, the President's
budget-as submitted to Congress-may not seek enough money for
compliance. Moreover, Congress, in authorizing and appropriating
funds, may cut an agency's budget request even further.
States and federal agencies disagree about whether insufficient
funds is a defense available to a federal agency for failing to comply
with a legally enforceable requirement.87 Certainly, insufficient funds
is not a defense for local governments and private sector polluters.
States therefore object to the federal government using insufficient
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
81. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
82. For example, Congress created the defense environmental restoration account in
1984. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-94, 97
Stat. 614.
83. H.R. REP. No. 200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1993).
84. Id. (recommending the authorization of $5.3 billion to DOE and $5.9 billion to
DOD for environmental activities and noting that the entire budget of EPA is $6.6 billion).
85. Exec. Order No. 12,088, supra note 30.
86. Id. 1-501. Paragraph 1-501 provides: "The head of each Executive agency shall
ensure that sufficient funds for compliance with applicable pollution control standards are
requested in the agency budget." Id.
87. See Rocky Flats InterAgency Agreement 96 (1991) (containing a paragraph in
which the state and DOE essentially disagree on whether insufficiency of funds is a defense
but agree that it is premature to adjudicate the existence of such a defense) (on file at
Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site).
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funds as a defense, particularly since Executive Order 12,088 seems to
indicate an executive branch commitment to funding environmental
compliance fully.88
In response, federal agencies have argued that the Anti-Defi-
ciency Act 9 protects them from court orders that require the spend-
ing of money above what Congress authorized and appropriated. This
law provides, in part:
No Executive Department or other Government establish-
ment of the United States shall expend, in any one fiscal
year, any sum in excess of appropriations made by Congress
for that fiscal year, or involve the Government in any con-
tract or other obligation for the future payment of money in
excess of such appropriations unless such contract or obliga-
tion is authorized by law.9 °
States have countered by pointing to the language in RCRA making
reliance on the "paramount interest" exemption for environmental
requirements contingent on the President's having "specifically re-
quested such appropriation as a part of the budgetary process and the
Congress [having] failed to make available such requested
appropriation." 91
In addition to arguing that insufficient funds is a defense shield-
ing federal facilities from the requirement of complying with environ-
mental mandates, policy-makers at federal agencies have also used
their understanding of the budgeting process to their advantage when
negotiating with the states about environmental compliance. The atti-
tude displayed by the Under Secretary of Energy, Admiral John Tuck,
toward making commitments to perform expensive environmental re-
quirements is an example of this tactic.92
In an interview with DOE's historian, Tuck discussed his tenure
during the Bush administration-1989 to 1992-when DOE's weap-
ons production facilities were, for the most part, not in production
due to safety and compliance related closures. To remove barriers for
the resumption of production, DOE strategists signed enforceable
agreements with the states and EPA to perform clean up and waste
88. Exec. Order 12,088, supra note 30.
89. Pub. L. No. 59-28, § 3679, 34 Stat. 27, 49 (1906).
90. Id.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (a).
92. Interview with John C. Tuck, Under Secretary of Energy, Reflections on Tenure as
the Under Secretary (Jan. 17, 1993) [hereinafter Tuck Interview] (transcript available from
the History Division of the Department of Energy).
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management activities by specified milestones.93 However, the DOE
signators knew that DOE would not be able to meet the time lines set
in these agreements because the funds necessary for compliance
would probably not be available in future fiscal years.94 As Tuck
stated: "[W]hen we were compelled to produce, we would be lever-
aged to be responsive to the environment. . .. "9 DOE officials' ra-
tionale was that, at the time, their most important task was getting the
idled weapons production factories back into service: "We got into
the compliance agreements, in my view, because we had to stay in
production to produce the requirements for the military."96 Environ-
mental hurdles stood in DOE's way, but regulatory agreements could
remove the hurdles, and for at least an interim period, DOE adopted
a policy of signing agreements. DOE officials were able to make such
agreements because Executive Order 12,088 only requires that an
agency head request sufficient funds for the instant fiscal year; it does
not bar that same agency head from making future commitments that
cannot be funded.97
High-level DOE personnel knew that the money necessary to
meet the legal obligations contained in these compliance agreements
would most likely not be available in the future, but determined that
ultimately it would fall to Congress to decide whether to fund the ac-
tivities required by the agreements:
It seems to me that what is going to happen is... [that the
lack of sufficient funds] will force somebody to actually sue
from some jurisdiction. You promised in this compliance
agreement that you would do this on this time line. You are
not delivering. So now we are going to sue you. And then
the judge issues a consent order, says thou shalt, etc. And
then what does... [the DOE Assistant Secretary for Environ-
mental Management] do? Does he take all the money away
from everything else and apply it to that one decision ... ?
See, sooner or later the thing has to collapse, and it has to go
back to the political process and they have to make the
decision.98
Unfortunately, at the time DOE was signing these agreements,
agency spokespersons were also claiming that DOE had adopted a
93. Id. at 2.
94. Id. at 3-4.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Exec. Order 12,088, supra note 30.
98. Tuck Interview, supra note 92, at 4.
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new understanding of the importance of environmental responsibil-
ity; the spokespersons pointed to DOE's willingness to engage in ne-
gotiation with states as evidence of change. Yet, the Tuck interview
confirms the worst suspicions of the skeptical regulatory and environ-
mental activist communities: DOE had not changed. The loss of trust
that resulted from DOE's actions with respect to the agreements en-
hanced the frustration that today still inhibits cooperation between
the states and DOE, cooperation necessary to effect this largest of
cleanup programs. 99
B. The Congressional Response: State Authority and Monetary Sanctions
Congress always intended federal facilities to comply with the na-
tion's environmental laws; in every major, enforceable statute, starting
with the Clean Air Act in 1970, Congress included a waiver of sover-
eign immunity,10 0 The courts' narrow interpretation of these waiv-
ers1° ' does not accurately reflect congressional intent. Nor do the
courts appear to have considered the powerful equity argument that
federal agencies should comply with environmental laws in the same
manner and to the same extent as private entities.10 2
Fundamentally, those who advocate authorizing states to impose
financial penalties on noncomplying federal agencies are simply pro-
moting the equitable notion that the federal government should com-
ply with environmental laws in the same manner that the private
sector complies.' Beyond that, these advocates believe that only the
99. For an overview of the importance of trust in the relationship between DOD, DOE,
and state regulators and a brief description of the lack thereof, see FEDERAL FACILITIES
ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION DIALOGUE COMMrrrEE, supra note 5, at v. EPA chartered this
committee "to develop consensus policy recommendations aimed at improving the ...
decision-making process to ensure that clean-up decisions reflect the priorities and con-
cerns of all stakeholders." Id.
100. Clean Air Act § 118, 42 U.S.C. § 7418 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
101. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text; see also infra note 111 and accompany-
ing text.
102. See Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD.
L. REv. 1516, 1543-1549 (1995).
103. See H.R. REP. No. 111, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1287, 1291 (recording statement that Congress's original intent behind the passage of the
Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1507, was to sub-
ject federal facilities to the same enforcement requirements and sanctions, including civil
penalties, that apply to state and local governments and private companies.
As several congressional members stated:
Americans demand Federal leadership in environmental efforts, not recalcitrance
from Federal agencies. Placing Federal facilities on an equal footing with private
facilities with respect to administrative orders and civil penalties will leave no
question of Congress' intent concerning Federal facilities compliance. This pro-
vision is necessary to restore the faith of the American people that protection of
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threat of financial penalties, coupled with the Damoclean sword of
criminal sanctions against individual federal employees, would create
the incentives necessary to motivate federal agencies to comply with
environmental requirements. 104 Not surprisingly, the executive
branch agencies alone opposed the notion that federal facilities
should have to comply with environmental regulations to the same
extent as nonfederal entities. 0 5 In opposing compliance, executive
branch agencies argued that the unitary executive theory logically pre-
vented EPA from enforcing environmental laws against sister agen-
cies. 106 DOD, DOE, and DOJ also argued that allowing states to
impose fines on federal facilities for violations of environmental laws
would serve not as an incentive for federal agencies' compliance, but
rather as a mere funds transfer from the federal to a state treasury, a
transfer that emboldened and avaricious states would actively seek.107
1. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976.-In order for a
state to sue a federal agency for enforcement of an environmental
statute, the federal government must waive its sovereign immunity
from such a suit.1 08 In two 1976 Supreme Court decisions, the Court
construed the waivers of sovereign immunity in both the Clean Air1
and Clean Water Acts 1 narrowly."' The Court issued these deci-
sions while Congress was considering the hazardous waste amend-
human health and the environment will not give way either to bureaucratic recal-
citrance, the lack of funding, or simple inactivity.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995: Hearings on S. 2182, H.R 4301 and
Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the House Comm. on Armed Services, Division
B-Military Construction: Hearing on H.R 4302 Before the Subcomm. on Military Installations
and Facilities of the House Committee on Armed Services, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 734 (1994)
[hereinafter Hearings] (reprinting statement of Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator,
EPA, to the American Defense Preparedness Association's 20th Environmental Symposium
and Exhibit on "Department of Defense Environmental Security-Strategies for the 21st
Century" (Mar. 15, 1994)).
104. See H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 103, at 2-6 (discussing the need to subject federal
facilities to the same environmental regulations and sanctions to which state and local
governments and private entities are subject because the federal government has been slow
to comply with environmental regulations).
105. Id. at 31-32 (discussing amendments proposed by DOD and DOE seeking tailored
regulations to address the potential conflict between some of RCRA's regulations and
DOD's and DOE's safety concerns).
106. See supra Part IA2.
107. See H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 103, at 19-20 (reprinting letter from the Congres-
sional Budget Office to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce suggesting that
the Federal Facilities Compliance Act may encourage states to seek the imposition of fines
and penalties against the federal government).
108. Hanford v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179-80 (1976).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 7418.
110. 33 U.S.C. § 1323.
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ments package to the Solid Waste Disposal Act, which became the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA). 112 Be-
cause of the two Supreme Court decisions, Congress included in
RCRA the most explicit waiver of sovereign immunity that it could
conceive at the time:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the execu-
tive . . . branch[ ] of the Federal Government . .. shall be
subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and
local requirements, both substantive and procedural (includ-
ing any requirement for permits or reporting or any provi-
sions for injunctive relief and such sanctions as may be
imposed by a court to enforce such relief), respecting con-
trol and abatement of solid waste or hazardous waste disposal
in the same manner, and to the same extent, as any person is
subject to such requirements.' 13
Unfortunately for the states, during the next sixteen years,
neither the courts nor the defense agencies uniformly read this lan-
guage in RCRA to mean that the defense agencies were subject to
monetary sanctions for noncompliance; nor did courts and defense
agencies read the language to mean that states could enforce RCRA
against federal facilities in a meaningful way.1 1 4 As more cases came
111. See Hanford, 426 U.S. at 198 (holding that, in view of the undoubted awareness of
Congress that waivers of sovereign immunity must be clear and express, Congress, in enact-
ing § 118 of the Clean Air Act, did not intend to subject federal installations to state permit
requirements); EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200, 227 (1976) (concluding that § 313 of the
Clean Water Act did not subject federal facilities to state permit programs). In both cases,
the Court found that Congress had not adequately expressed its waiver of sovereign immu-
nity. Hanford, 426 U.S. at 198; EPA v. California, 426 U.S. at 227. For a general discussion
of how narrowly the Supreme Court, in particular, and federal courts, in general, have
read sovereign immunity waivers in environmental statutes, see Robert Percival, Overcoming
Interpretive Formalism: Legislative Reversals ofJudicial Construtions of Sovereign Immunity Waiv-
ers in the Environmental Statutes, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 221 (1993).
112. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as RCRA § 6001, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6961).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (a).
114. A number of courts have held that the RCRA waiver would not allow states to im-
pose fines on federal agencies. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. 1627
(1992) (reversing court of appeals decision that held that Congress waived immunity from
punitive fines under RCRA and Clean Water Act); Maine v. Department of Navy, 973 F.2d
1007, 1011, 1015 (1st Cir. 1992) (vacating a district court ruling that had found the Navy
liable for punitive fines imposed under a state hazardous waste law); Mitzelfelt v. Depart-
ment of the Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1293 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the Air Force
was not required to pay any fines under RCRA); United States v. Washington, 872 F.2d 874,
875 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that RCRA did not contain an unequivocal waiver of sover-
eign immunity); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 665 F. Supp. 601,
605 (E.D. Cal.) (holding that "a waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and concise
and unequivocal"), dismissed in part, 707 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Cal. 1986) and dismissed in part
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down finding the waiver of sovereign immunity inadequate, Congress
began reconsidering the statutory waiver." 5
In 1987, shortly after the first such court decision, various con-
gressional committees began holding hearings to consider legislation
to clarify--or reaffirm-the broad scope of the RCRA waiver.1 6 De-
spite opposition from the Executive Branch, both houses of Congress
passed federal facilities compliance bills by the end of the 101st Con-
gress;" 7 however, members could not reconcile the two versions.
Both houses of Congress reconsidered the bills in the 102nd Con-
gress," but for most of that two year period, the bills languished be-
cause of seemingly irreconcilable differences, none of which involved
the waiver of sovereign immunity. Then, only months after the
Supreme Court's ruling in United States Department of Energy v. Ohio,"19
which narrowly construed RCRA's waiver of sovereign immunity, Con-
gress passed the Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992 (FFCA).2 °
The FFCA directly addressed the Supreme Court's holdings
about the citizens' suits and waiver of sovereign immunity provi-
sions. ' 2  With regard to citizen suits, the Act amended the definition
of person to "include each department, agency and instrumentality of
the United States."' 22 For the waiver section itself, the Act inserted
the following two sentences:
The Federal, State, interstate, and local substantive and pro-
cedural requirements referred to in this subsection include,
but are not limited to, all administrative orders and all civil
and administrative penalties and fines, regardless of whether
such penalties or fines are punitive or coercive in nature or
are imposed for isolated, intermittent, or continuing viola-
tions. The United States hereby expressly waives any immu-
nity otherwise applicable to the United States with respect to
sub nom. McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Cheney, 763 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. Cal.
1989); Meyer v. United States Coast Guard, 644 F. Supp. 221, 221 (E.D.N.C. 1986) (hold-
ing that RCRA did not waive Coast Guard's immunity to state imposed fines); see aLso Perci-
val, supra note 111, at 240-44 (discussing the waiver of sovereign immunity in RCRA).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 6961.
116. See H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 103, at 2.
117. See H.R. REP. No. 886, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 17 (1992).
118. See id.; H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 103, at 1.
119. 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
120. Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
121. The FFCA only applies to RCRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 6961. Because Congress has yet to
amend the Clean Water Act, both states and citizen groups remain subject to the holdings
of United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1627, and thus, there are still no
effective sanctions for a federal agency's noncompliance with the Clean Water Act.
122. 42 U.S.C. 6903(15).
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any such substantive or procedural requirement (including,
but not limited to, any injunctive relief, administrative order
or civil or administrative penalty or fine referred to in the
preceding sentence, or reasonable service charge).*1
In addition to amending the citizens' suit and waiver provisions,
the FFCA also provides federal facilities four areas of relief, three of
which specifically help defense agencies.1 24 First, the Act gives DOE
relief from immediate enforcement of RCRA's provisions for treat-
ment, storage, and disposal of mixed radioactive and hazardous
materials by establishing a process that allows DOE an additional
three years to comply or enter into a compliance order.1 25 Second,
for the Navy, the Act exempts from RCRA's storage, inspection, label-
ing and recordkeeping requirements "hazardous waste generated on a
public vessel," defined as "a vessel owned or bareboat chartered and
operated by the United States.' 1 6 Third, the Act directed the Admin-
istrator of EPA to propose by May 1993 "regulations identifying when
military munitions become hazardous waste" and to promulgate such
regulation "[n] ot later than 24 months after such date."' 27
2. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Li-
ability Act of 1980.-In 1986, Congress passed the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act (SARA),' 2 8  which amended
CERCLA.'1 Among its many provisions, SARA included specific di-
rections for remediating contamination at federal facilities.1l 0
Through SARA, Congress granted EPA and state regulatory agencies
123. Id. § 6961(a).
124. Id. §§ 6924(4), 6939(c)-(d); see infra text accompanying notes 125-126. The fourth,
providing that the discharges of pollutants from federally owned treatment works be
treated the same under RCRA as the discharge of publicly owned, i.e., municipal treatment
works, benefits DOE and DOD, but applies to all federal agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 6939(e).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 6939(c).
126. Id. § 6939(d).
127. Id. § 6924(4). EPA has not yet issued this rule. The University of Maryland Envi-
ronmental Law Clinic filed a deadlines suit to compel its issuance in the D.C. District Court
on December 8, 1994. In late May, the District Court for the District of Columbia issued a
consent decree requiring EPA to begin notice and comment on proposed regulations by
October 31, 1995. Consent Decree at 2, Tides Found. v. Browner (D.D.C. May 31, 1995)
(No. 1:94CV02663).
128. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (amending scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
129. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
130. Id. § 9620.
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the authority to impose fines and penalties on federal agencies failing
to comply with the terms of CERCLA.' 13
More than anything else, the 1986 amendments establish a pro-
cess for how environmental restoration activities should proceed at
federal sites."' 2 Although the 1980 Superfund law applied to federal
facilities, the methodology set out for how EPA should proceed
against federal agencies was inadequate. Moreover, the states' role in
the original legislation was poorly conceived. The amendments clarify
the respective jurisdictions of EPA and the states at federal sites.' 3
In particular, the amendments provide for the establishment of a
Federal Agency Hazardous Waste Compliance Docket,"s the assess-
ment, evaluation and inclusion of federal facilities on the Docket," 5
and the time frame for the commencement of remedial investigation
and action at sites on the National Priority List (NPL).136 The reme-
dial investigation and action at sites on the NPL is now governed by an
interagency-EPA and federal facility owner-agreement. 137 The
amendments also allow the President to issue orders regarding re-
sponse actions at DOD and DOE facilities, including orders exempt-
ing sites from CERCLA requirements when such an order is necessary
to protect national security interests. 13
In addressing the proper role of the states, SARA divides states'
jurisdiction between NPL and non-NPL federal facilities, giving states
lead responsibility at federal facilities that were not on the NPL.1
3 9
SARA also provided that the EPA Administrator shall allow "state and
local officials the opportunity to participate in the planning and selec-
tion of the remedial action."'" Finally, the amendments attempted to
increase the enforcement authority of states and others by referencing
RCRA in the waiver of sovereign immunity;' this waiver, while less
131. Id. But see Maine v. Department of Navy, 973 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding
that Maine could not seek monetary civil penalties from the Navy under CERCLA).
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 9620.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a) (4), (f).
134. Id. § 9620(c).
135. Id. § 9620(d).
136. Id. § 9620(e) (2), (3).
137. Id. § 9620(e) (2), (4). The amendments articulated some of the particulars of such
interagency agreements. Id. For example, § 9620(e) (4) provided that the EPA Adminis-
trator and federal facility owner/operator jointly select the final remedy, but also provided
that the Administrator prevailed in the event of a disagreement. Id The amendment also
contained dispute resolution provisions. Id.
138. Id. § 96200).
139. Id. § 9620(a) (4).
140. Id. §§ 9620(f), 9621(f).
141. Id. § 9620(b).
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specific than its RCRA counterpart,1 42 would allow a state to obtain
monetary penalties for violations.14 3 As a practical matter, SARA's rec-
ognition of the state role in remediating contamination at federal fa-
cilities creates a system where the section 120 interagency agreements
could, and have, become triparty agreements with state, EPA and fed-
eral agency signatories. 144
II. EXPERIENCE
DOD has estimated that remediation of all its contaminated sites
will cost over $24.5 billion for fiscal years 1991-2012.' For fiscal year
1995, Congress authorized DOD to spend roughly two billion dollars
on environmental compliance other than clean up activities. 146 For
remediation work, Congress authorized $2.3 billion, of which $1.4 bil-
lion was for active bases,1 47 and the balance for bases being closed
under the base closure laws. 148
142. The language of § 9620 (a) closely follows RCRA's waiver of sovereign immunity in
42 U.S.C. § 6961. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a). But see Maine v. Department of Navy, 973 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir.
1992) (holding that in light of United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627
(1992), Maine could not seek penalties against the Navy under RCRA or CERCLA). In
Maine v. Department of Navy, the First Circuit reasoned that, despite the different language
in the two statutes, the CERCIA language was not a clear enough waiver of sovereign
immunity to pass the Supreme Court's test. Maine v. Department of Navy, 973 F.2d at
1010-11. Moreover, the court found CERCLA's legislative history ambiguous. Id. at 1011.
The court found the express linkage in the CERCIA waiver, 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a), to the
flawed RCRA waiver, 42 U.S.C. § 6961, compelling. Maine v. Department of Navy, 973 F.2d
at 1011. The court observed that because the statutory language and the legislative history
of the SARA waiver of sovereign immunity referred to both RCRA and CERCLA and be-
cause the Supreme Court had found the RCRA waiver inadequate, the Superfund waiver
must also be inadequate. Id. The package of Superfund amendments that passed both the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce and the House Committee on Public Works
and Transportation in 1994 would have amended the CERCIA waiver to track the new
FFCA language. See H.R. 4916, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(e), (f).
145. NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DWiSION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, B213706, HAzARDous MATERIAS" UPGRADING OF UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS
CAN BE IMPROVED TO AVOID CosTLY CLEANUPs 5 (1992). Outside experts have suggested
that the costs could be double that estimate. Cf. supra note 5.
146. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-377,
§ 301(1)-(5), 108 Stat. 2663, 2707 (1994) [hereinafter National Defense Authorization Act-
Fiscal Year 1995]; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 701, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 651, 660, 662
(1994).
147. Id.
148. Id. § 2405(a) (9)-(10); Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and
Realignment Act, Pub. L. No. 101-526, 102 Stat. 2623 (1988); see also National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L No. 101-510, § 2901, 104 Stat. 1485, 1808
(1990).
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DOE has recently released its first systematic assessment of the
costs of remediating its nuclear weapons facilities, which, while far
fewer in number than DOD sites, are far more complicated to clean
largely because of their extensive radioactive contamination. 14 9 The
DOE base case was $230 billion and the likely case $340 billion, both
of which include all waste management costs as well as the costs of
decontaminating and decommissioning the facilities, but each of
these estimates assume less than complete remediation. 15 ° DOE will
spend roughly $5 billion on its defense environmental programs in
fiscal year 1995, $1.5 billion of which will be spent on remediation and
$2.8 billion on compliance. 151
A. The Federal Facilities Compliance Act and Section 120 Enforcement
Statistics for the Department of Defense and the Department of
Energy
1. Total Fines Are a Tiny Fraction of the Federal Agencies' Compliance
Budgets.-In 1994, the second year that regulators operated with the
additional powers given to them under the Federal Facilities Compli-
ance Act (FFCA), EPA and the states proposed fines for military facili-
ties under the FFCA of over $5.7 million.'52 Because this figure
represents the initial assessment of penalties in a process that usually
results in the targeted facility paying a lesser fine, EPA and the states
are unlikely to- collect more than four million dollars.15 ' Since the
total amount of spending for DOD and DOE on environmental com-
pliance was over $4 billion,' such fines are not likely, ultimately, to
represent more than 0.10% of the two agencies' total compliance
spending. However, because most of the fines paid came from a few
large settlements, some military bases would dispute the de minimis
149. See BASEUNE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT REPORT, supra note 12.
150. Id. at ix-x. Unofficial estimates, done for an internal executive branch study of the
costs of federal facilities clean up, put the figure as high as $1.6 trillion. MARK REISCH,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SUPERFUND REAUTHORIZATION IssuEs IN THE 104TH CON-
GRESS 5 (1995).
151. National Defense Authorization Act-Fiscal Year 1995, supra note 146, § 3102.
152. Memorandum from Jim Edward, Director, Planning, Prevention, and Compliance
Staff, FFEO, to Pete Rosenberg, Constituent Outreach & Communications Division, attach.
1 (Nov. 17, 1994) [hereinafter EPA 1994 Data] (information request for OECA's FY 1994
End of Year Press Conference).
153. Of the 24 penalties settled under 42 U.S.C. § 6928 in 1994, only nine were for
100% of the proposed amount. Taken together, EPA and the states collected just under
68% of the total amount assessed originally-$1,541,475 of $2,266,398. If one removes the
$1,142,100 settlement of the Army's Fort Hood fine, the overall recovery percentage drops
to 42.5%. See id.
154. See supra notes 145, 151 and accompanying text.
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nature of the overall penalty picture.1 55 Nonetheless, the facts to date
indicate that the concern for the federal fisc during the course of the
debate over the FFCA15 1 was in fact, overwrought.
The CERCLA penalties assessed against the defense agencies are
even more trivial when one compares the amount of penalties with
the amount these agencies have budgeted for restoration. On a fiscal
year 1995 budget of almost $4 billion for environmental restoration
activities, 57 Congress was asked to authorize and appropriate funds to
pay three fines, one against the Army for $500,000 and two against
DOE, each for $50,000.15' During the 1994 calendar year, EPA also
assessed $1.27 million in stipulated penalties under ten separate Inter-
agency Agreements.'
59
These sums fail to account for Supplemental Environmental
Projects (SEPs), assessments that the defense agencies agree to pay in
addition to, or in lieu of, a fine. SEPs are an EPA creation, sought by
that Agency under certain circumstances,' 6° always as a part of a
broader settlement of environmental noncompliance.' 6 ' Typically,
SEP activities take the form of environmentally beneficial projects that
neither EPA nor the violator would otherwise fund, such as pollution
prevention activities, waste management initiatives, and environmen-
tal education projects. EPA policy describes the types of projects that
may qualify as SEPs and specifies that there be a "nexus" between the
violation and the SEP. 162 For example, in 1994, DOE.agreed to pay
Colorado and EPA a total of $2.8 million for violations of its inter-
agency agreement at the Rocky Flats Site;' 63 of this sum, $1.63 million
155. One settlement reached in 1994 at the Army's Fort Hood, Texas was over one mil-
lion dollars. Only two others were even in the six figure range: a $100,000 fine at the El
Centro Naval Air Station in California, and a $138,922 payment at the Iowa Ammunition
Plant. EPA 1994 Data, supra note 152, attach. 1.
156. H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 103, at 20 (reprinting letter from the Congressional
Budget Office to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce suggesting that clarify-
ing the waiver "may encourage states to seek and impose fines and penalties against the
federal government").
157. See supra notes 147, 151.
158. National Defense Authorization Act-Fiscal Year 1995, supra note 146, §§ 324, 3133.
159. See EPA 1994 Data, supra note 152, attach. 1.
160. See Office of Enforcement, EPA, Draft Revised-EPA Supplemental Environmental
Projects Policy 1, 11-12 (Feb. 1995) [hereinafter SEP Policy] (draft policy on file with
EPA).
161. See id. at 1 ("To further EPA's goals to protect and enhance public health and the
environment, in certain instances environmentally beneficial projects, or... [SEPs], may
be included in the settlement.").
162. Id. at 5.
163. Rocky Flats InterAgency Agreement, supra note 87.
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is for SEPs. 6 4 Together, DOE and DOD agreed to pay $2.15 million
for EPA-approved SEPs in fiscal year 1994.165 Thus, the grand total
for all types of environmentally-based fines and payments in lieu of
fines in fiscal year 1994 for both defense agencies was likely to total
less than ten million dollars. 1
66
2. Largest Fine Brings Congressional Scrutiny.-It is not the trivial
penalties assessed against federal agencies, but rather the occasional
large assessments that bring federal facilities' fines to the attention of
Congress. The Rocky Flats settlement was the largest sum that either
DOE or DOD agreed to pay in 1994 for a Superfund agreement viola-
tion. The largest proposed fines under the FFCA resulted from three
Notices of Violation issued to the Army. At Fort Hood, EPA and
Texas released, to much press fanfare, a Notice of Violation on Octo-
ber 1, 1993 seeking $1.3 million in penalties,'67 of which the Army
agreed to pay over $1 million. 6 ' EPA and Alaska also issued two No-
tices of Violation to the Army's Forts Richardson and Wainwright, for
$1.2 million and $800,000 respectively. 69 The agencies have not yet
settled these cases.
During the spring of 1994, the House Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities held two hear-
ings on the DOD's proposed fiscal year 1995 budget. During the
hearings, members received testimony and discussed with federal and
state Officials the nature of DOD's environmental compliance respon-
sibilities. 7 ° Because the Fort Hood Notice of Violation raised the
hackles of several members of Congress, these hearings provided a
forum to address the issue of federal facilities paying fines for non-
compliance with environmental laws.
164. In re Rocky Flats, Settlement Agreement and State Compliance Order on Consent
No. 94-07-07-01; EPA Docket No. CERCLA-VII-91-03 & RCRA-VIII-91-07, para. c (1994)
[hereinafter Tolling Agreement] (on file with EPA).
165. See EPA 1994 Data, supra note 152, attach. 1.
166. See supra notes 152-162 and accompanying text.
167. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECrION AGENCY, FACT SHEET, FORT HOOD ARMY BASE (Oct. 1,
1993) (on file with author).
168. EPA 1994 Data supra note 152, attach. 1. That the Army settled this case approxi-
mately one year later for such a large fraction of the initial amount sought by EPA and
Texas is remarkable, particularly in light of the congressional attention paid to this particu-
lar fine. See infra notes 171-177 and accompanying text. The Army's willingness to pay can
be seen as a vindication of the validity and gravity of the underlying violations.
169. Notice of Legal Proceedings, In re Fort Wainwright, Alaska (EPA Region 10 Apr. 29,
1994) (RCRA No. 1093-09-09-3008); Notice of Legal Proceedings, In re Fort Richardson,
Alaska (EPA Region 10 Apr. 29, 1994) (RCRA No. 1093-06-18-3008).
170. Hearings, supra note 103, at 1.
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At the first hearing, Congressman Chet Edwards, the representa-
tive from the district in which Fort Hood is located, characterized the
FFCA as a "little-known law," and criticized EPA's authority to inspect
DOD facilities and then take enforcement action including seeking
fines. 171 The Congressman stated: "I don't think [this] is a produc-
tive way to run our environmental business. I don't think there are
more than ten members of Congress that knew what the implications
were of that bill that we passed."172
Congressman Edwards' comments focused on the relationship
between EPA and the Army, as sister agencies within the same execu-
tive branch, and on the propriety of EPA's emphasis on enforcement
over cooperation. 17 Along with the subcommittee chair, Congress-
man Dave McCurdy, Edwards also questioned whether the violations
charged at Fort Hood and other defense facilities were meaningful
and substantive in nature, or simply technical.1 7 1 Congressman Ed-
wards' latter line of inquiry may have had its genesis in the nature of
the Army activities that resulted in the bulk of the problems at Fort
Hood. They were activities-like setting and extinguishing fires-in
which the Army has long engaged and that are critical to maintaining
troop readiness. For example, EPA alleged that Fort Hood had stored
waste oil contaminated with trace amounts of solvents without a per-
mit at its fire training pit. 75 EPA further alleged that some of this oil
had spilled or leaked onto the ground and the Army had burned this
oil without a permit.
176
3. EPA's Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Raises Questions
About Priorities. -Regardless of whether it is applied to private or fed-
171. Id. at 37-38.
172. Id.
173. Id. The Congressman described the Federal Facilities Compliance Act as requiring
that there be "a purely adversarial relationship" between EPA and DOD. Id. at 37. For
other examples of congressional scrutiny of EPA enforcement actions on military bases, see
id. at 756-58, 856-62.
174. Id. at 712. The EPA responded to Congressman Edwards's queries in a May 13,
1994 letter which described the specific violations levied against Fort Hood. Id. at 714-20
(reprinting letter from Steven A. Herman, EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement,
to Congressman Chet Edwards).
175. Id. at 714-15.
176. Id. The EPA contended that Army soldiers were exposed to toxic fumes from burn-
ing the hazardous oil. Id. at 714. In addition, the water and other liquids used to extin-
guish the fire mixed with the oil and overflowed at least once into surrounding soil and a
stream used for swimming. Id. at 714-15. The overflow also may have contaminated the
groundwater. Id. at 715. In a joint investigation, EPA and the Texas Natural Resources
Commission discovered that several hundred gallons of hazardous waste had been spilled.
Id.
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eral facilities that violate environmental laws, EPA's SEP policy func-
tions primarily as an expenditures-in-lieu-of-penalties mechanism. To
the extent that the policy results in regulated entities funding pollu-
tion prevention programs that they would not otherwise pursue, the
policy undoubtedly has a beneficial environmental impact. Moreover,
the types of programs that receive SEP funds support are usually those
that are most likely to reduce future dependence on toxic substances,
and thus are most likely to decrease future environmental compliance
and restoration costs.
Yet, in the federal facilities' arena, the use of public money to
fund even worthy programs that Congress did not authorize, raises
two issues. First, it raises the issue of the lack of congressional authori-
zation. Second, the funneling of money away from environmental
programs that Congress did authorize inherently raises the issue of
the nation's environmental spending priorities. With regard to the
lack of authorization, agencies have resolved this concern, at least in
the CERCLA arena, by seeking specific line item authorizations for
fines paid to the Superfund itself in the following year's budget.'7 7 To
date, RCRA fines appear to be paid from generally authorized compli-
ance funds, perhaps on the theory that, while Congress did not ex-
pressly authorize the payment of such penalties, in authorizing an
agency to comply with environmental regulations, Congress impliedly
authorized the payment of all expenses associated with being regu-
lated, including the payment of penalties. Whether this practice is
consistent with regulations curtailing the discretionary use of funds,
such as Executive Order 12,088178 and the Anti-Deficiency Act1 79 is
177. See National Defense Authorization Act-Fiscal Year 1995, supra note 146, § 324 (au-
thorizing the Secretary of Defense to pay $500,000 into the Superfund for payment of civil
penalties assessed under CERCLA against the West Virginia ordnance works).
178. Exec. Order No. 12,088, supra note 85. Executive Order 12,088 states in pertinent
part: "The head of each Executive agency shall ensure that funds appropriated and appor-
tioned for the prevention, control and abatement of environmental pollution are not used
for any other purpose unless permitted by law and specifically approved by the Office of
Management and Budget." Id. § 1-501.
179. Pub. L No. 59-28, § 3679, 34 Stat. 27, 49 (1906). The Anti-Deficiency Act provides
in pertinent part:
All appropriations made for contingent expenses or other general purposes ...
[shall be] apportioned by monthly or other allotments as to prevent expenditures
in one portion of the year which may necessitate deficiency or additional appro-
priations to complete the service of the fiscal year for which said appropriations
are made; and all such apportionments shall be adhered to and shall not be
waived or modified except upon the happening of some extraordinary emer-
gency or unusual circumstance which could not be anticipated at the time of
making such apportionment... and in case said apportionments are waived or
modified as herein provided, the same shall be waived or modified in writing by
the head of such Executive Department or other Government establishment hav-
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not a question that has been presented directly either to Congress or
to a court.
Moreover, taking funds away from compliance to pay environ-
mental penalties distorts congressional intent with regard to environ-
mental spending. This distortion is particularly acute when agencies
which may be subject to environmental penalties claim not to have
sufficient funds available to meet all of their compliance
obligations.'l 0
B. Following the Money: Sources, Authorization and Termini
The basic problem with trying to use fines against federal facili-
ties as an incentive to encourage compliance with environmental obli-
gations is that the money used to pay the fine ultimately comes from
the budget of the office within the defense agency that is (1) responsi-
ble for environmental compliance, (2) most likely to advocate envi-
ronmental compliance, and (3) least likely to be able to shift funds
within its own budget so that the payment of the fine will not adversely
affect other environmental compliance activities. Moreover, because
of political changes within the executive branch, the agency office
that must find the funds within its budget to pay environmental fines
may no longer have on staff the personnel who made the environmen-
tal commitments that the agency ultimately is unable to meet."8 " As a
result, the office whose budget is adversely affected by the payment of
environmental fines may be the very part of the agency that environ-
mental regulatory agencies most want to protect and nurture.
For example, in 1994, DOE, EPA, and Colorado reached an
agreement (the tolling agreement)18 2 in settlement of violations of
their interagency agreement governing environmental restoration
under CERCLA and RCRA at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technol-
ing control of the expenditure, and the reasons therefor shall be fully set forth in
each particular case and communicated to Congress in connection with estimates
for any additional appropriations required on account thereof.
Id.
180. Heanngs on S. 2182 Before the House of Rresentatives Committee on Armed Services, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. 143 (1994) (prepared statement of Thomas P. Grumbly, Assistant Secretary
for Environmental Management, United States Department of Energy) [hereinafter House
Grumbly Statement]; Hearing on Waste Management and Cleanup Activities at the Han-
ford Nuclear Reservation Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. 20, 22 (1995) (comments and prepared statement of Thomas P.
Grumbly) [hereinafter Senate Grumbly Statement].
181. See Tuck Interview, supra note 92, at 2-4 (discussing the environmental compliance
agreements that DOE officials under the Bush administration entered into, agreements
which the officials knew they could not fulfill).
182. Tolling Agreement, supra note 164.
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ogy Site. The violations at issue in the tolling agreement resulted en-
tirely from DOE's repeated inability to meet the enforceable
interagency agreement schedule signed after two years of negotiations
by the Bush administration early in 1991.18" In the tolling agreement,
DOE agreed to pay a total of $2.8 million to EPA and Colorado, which
was apportioned between penalties and Supplemental Environmental
Projects." 4 The parties also agreed that payment of the funds pursu-
ant to the agreement was not to "affect implementation of required
environmental work at Rocky Flats."" s5 Despite this agreement, the
payment of the fines did diminish the money available for remedia-
tion at Rocky Flats in the following manner. To pay the first installa-
tion of the fines and SEPs required by the tolling agreement, Rocky
Flats stopped field work at four hazardous waste sites being
remediated pursuant to the interagency agreement. Since this trans-
fer was insufficient, Rocky Flats scrambled to find "cost savings" to pay
the rest.1 8 6 If cost savings were insufficient, then DOE-Rocky Flats de-
termined that it would request the remainder of the money to pay the
fine as part of DOE's 1996 budget request to Congress."8 7
Because of the manner in which Congress advances money to
DOE, the Department had little choice about where it could get
money to pay the Rocky Flats settlement. The contamination of
Rocky Flats may have initially been caused by production of weapons,
an operation now conducted by DOE's Office of Defense Programs,
but Congress specifies the amount of money that the Office of De-
fense Programs can spend on each of its activities; the line authoriza-
tions for defense missions do not allow for environmental
spending.' Furthermore, Congress funds environmental restoration
through a separate authorization to the Office of Environmental Man-
agement.18 9 To transfer money between the two accounts, DOE must
seek a "reprogramming" from Congress.' 9° Reprogramming is a long
process that requires both a rigorous internal evaluation and a jour-
ney to the Hill for authorization to reprogram. 191 At the end of the
183. Id. at 1; Rocky Flats InterAgency Agreement, supra note 87.
184. Tolling Agreement, supra note 164.
185. Id. para. h.
186. Id.
187. Dr. Ray Greenberg, Office of Environmental Restoration, Rocky Flats Program,
Briefing on Settlement Agreement and Consent Order "Tolling Agreement" (1994) (on
file with DOE).
188. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act-Fiscal Year 1995, supra note 146,
§§ 3101, 3103.
189. Id. § 3102.
190. Id. § 3121.
191. Id.
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process, any of the four congressional committees192 involved can
deny a request for reprogramming.
Congress authorizes and appropriates funds for environmental
restoration as a single block grant to the agencies; for neither DOE
nor DOD does Congress explicitly split the funds between the defense
services, DOE field offices, or either agency's individual sites. 9 How-
ever, the backup documentation that the President submits with each
budget does break down the aggregate sum into amounts for each
activity."' After agency headquarters releases the money to the field
office or service, it becomes exceedingly difficult to move funds be-
tween them. So, if an unanticipated need for money arises at one
base or field office, for example, as a result of the imposition of a fine,
then headquarters will force that base or field office to find the money
necessary to respond to its need.' 5 For the Department of Defense,
once environmental remediation funds have been allocated to the
services, any chance of redistribution between services vanishes.
Moreover, the practicalities of budget building and the rough
balance of power between the executive and legislative branches
mean that, even if it does not appear that a particular program is tak-
ing money to pay a fine from other activities, the agency as a whole
may be. Consider again the numbers involved. Congress received a
request from the President for $1.4 billion for DOE environmental
restoration. According to backup documents prepared by the admin-
istration, $161 million of that was earmarked for environmental resto-
ration at Rocky Flats.'9 6 The backup documentation includes less
than three pages explaining the work to be done at Rocky Flats.' 97
As just one item in a defense budget of over $260 billion, it is
unlikely that any congressional member or aide will determine (1)
whether that $161 million has enough cushion to cover the $2.8 mil-
lion fine imposed on Rocky Flats in the tolling agreement without
192. The four committees involved are the House National Security Committee, the
Senate Armed Services Committees, and the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees.
193. National Defense Authorization Act-Fiscal Year 1995, supra note 146, §§ 301(15),
3102.
194. 5 DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOE/CR-0024, FY 1995 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REQUEST: EN-
VIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 196 (1994). In fiscal year 1995 this
amounted to $1.4 million. Id.
195. See FEDERAL FACILITIES ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION DIALOGUE COMMITrEE, supra
note 5, at vii-viii (making recommendations encouraging federal agencies to consult each
other on the funding for environmental regulation and to set priorities in the event of
funding shortfalls).
196. 5 DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 194, at 198.
197. Id. at 231-33.
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hurting the program described in the backup documents,19 (2)
whether the cuts proposed to cover the fine and SEP payment are the
least intrusive to the program,'99 or (3) whether DOE headquarters
adjusted the allocations of money for environmental compliance and
restoration at the field offices to assist Rocky Flats in paying the fine
without jeopardizing other environmental restoration requirements.
While these questions are unanswered, it is clear that the money to
pay the fine at Rocky Flats did not come from Defense Programs,
since Defense Programs no longer conducts production activities at
the site. Instead, the money to pay the fine came from Rocky Flats'
environmental management account, because that is the source of the
entire Rocky Flats budget."' 0 Because DOE had to pay the fine with
money from the existing authorization for environmental restoration,
Rocky Flats environmental restoration personnel had to curtail and
postpone restoration activities.
In addition, there is no guarantee that any of the money paid to
EPA and Colorado will be given back to benefit Rocky Flats environ-
mental restoration. For example, the $700,000 fine assessed in the
tolling agreement was split evenly between Colorado and EPA; DOE
was to pay Colorado its half in 1994 and EPA its half in fiscal year
1996.201 None of this money will be used for environmental restora-
tion at Rocky Flats.202 Of the remainder, DOE was to contract for
$1,630,000 worth of work to be done on SEPs20 mutually agreed
upon and beneficial to DOE, EPA and Colorado by the end of
1994.204 However, the settlement does not require that any of the
money for SEPs be spent at Rocky Flats.205
198. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
200. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 4 (1995).
201. Tolling Agreement, supra note 164, paras. a, b.
202. The tolling agreement provides that the $350,000 for EPA would go into the
Superfund, the fund that EPA uses for restoration of sites where there is no potentially
responsible party to pick up the expenses. Id. para. a. The Colorado Department of
Health's portion would go into the state's general fund, id. para. b., notwithstanding the
provision of the Federal Facilities Compliance Act that fines received thereunder are to be
spent for environmental enforcement, because Colorado law, COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-15-
212(1) (1989), does not allow for such a procedure and thus is exempted by the terms of
the FFCA. FFCA § 6001(c).
203. See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text.
204. Tolling Agreement, supra note 164, para c.
205. The agreement does, however, state that the money be used to "find SEPs which
relate to, and are at or in the vicinity of Rocky Flats." Id. This provision satisfies EPA's SEP
policy which requires that SEPs have a nexus to the original violation. See SEP Policy, supra
note 160, at 5.
1505
MARYLAND LAw REVIEW
In light of the recent testimony by DOE's Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management about the enormous problems in his
program because of insufficient funds,2" 6 it is not surprising that some
members of Congress question the payment of any fines or the fund-
ing of SEPs because such payments channel money away from the
enormous task of remediating DOE's weapons complex. Moreover,
Colorado's agreement to take money away from cleanup at Rocky
Flats and move that money to lower priority environmental activities
undercuts states' repeated assertions that they enforce against federal
agencies not merely to line their coffers but to achieve environmental
ends.2" 7 If state officials truly believe that federal facilities pose real
risks to their citizens and that federal tax dollars going for site
remediation is critical, then it would be against the state's interest to
enter into an agreement that diverts funds from federal facility clean
up to other activities that, while perhaps environmentally beneficial,
have not been previously funded because they are of lesser priority.
C. Unintended Consequences: When Federal and State Enforcement
Agendas Collide
The 1986 amendments to CERCLA20° directly acknowledged that
the states' potentially overlapping authority under RCRA's corrective
action provisions set up both positive and negative possibilities. The
positive is the possibility for collaboration between regulatory agen-
cies. The negative is the potential of a battle for advantage between
regulatory agencies with differing agendas.
The efforts to force two federal facilities in Colorado to comply
with environmental regulations offer examples of both the advantages
and the problems that can occur as a result of states' overlapping au-
thority under RCRA's corrective action provisions. The experience at
Rocky Flats demonstrates the advantage of such o(erlapping activity.
At the Site, EPA and Colorado worked together closely in trying to
force DOE to come into compliance with RCRA and to begin serious
remediation efforts. While there has been litigation regarding Rocky
Flats, the regulators have never been on opposite sides. In addition,
while the agencies have not always agreed completely about tactics,
starting in 1986, they have signed a series of combination CERCLA
206. House Grumbly Statement, supra note 180, at 143.
207. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
208. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
1506 [VOL. 54:1475
1995] FEDERAL FACILITY ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE
section 1202' and RCRA21° corrective action agreements governing
restoration at the site.211
In contrast, at the Army's Rocky Mountain Arsenal, EPA and Col-
orado, rather than joining to challenge the Army's noncompliance at
the site, spent over a decade fighting each other for regulatory advan-
tage. Since 1983, the parties, in a prolonged series of court battles,
have argued over the legal question: "Does CERCLA trump
RCRA?" 2 12 Most recently, the state has prevailed; federal courts have
held that Colorado may impose RCRA corrective action requirements
that are more stringent than restoration measures embodied in an
EPA-Army consent decree reached under the CERCLA section 120213
process.
2 14
A comparison of the field results-in terms of remediation-at
the Arsenal and Rocky Flats show that the Arsenal is further along. In
fact, the parties at the Arsenal just signed a conceptual agreement pre-
scribing an overall remedy that settles the various disputes. 1 5 How-
ever, this comparison is somewhat misleading both because the Army
began its efforts at the Arsenal first and because it did not have to deal
with some of the complexities that DOE faces at Rocky Flats, such as
an active work force in the thousands, ongoing waste generation,
treatment and storage, and significant quantities of hazardous materi-
als in on-site buildings. Additionally, because the Army only has to
address ground water and soil contamination, 16 its job is logistically
easier than the clean up job at Rocky Flats where the bulk of radioac-
tive materials contamination are in the buildings.21 7
209. 42 U.S.C. § 9620.
210. 42 U.S.C. § 6961.
211. The three parties signed their first agreement in 1986. FBI Affidavit, supra note 36,
attach. 3, at 44. The second agreement was signed in 1991. See supra note 163 and accom-
panying text.
212. See Vicky L. Peters et al., Can States Enforce RCRA at Superfund Sites? The Rocky Moun-
tain Arsenal Decision, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. InsL) 10,419 (1993) (discussing the court
battles over this question).
213. 42 U.S.C. § 9620.
214. Colorado v. United States Dep't of Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1570, 1572 (D. Colo.
1989), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. CL 922 (1994).
215. See Conceptual Agreement Between the U.S. Army, Shell Oil Co., the State of Colo-
rado, EPA, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for the Cleanup of the Rocky Mountain
Arsenal (June 13, 1995) (on file with author); State of Colorado News Release Pertaining
to Clean Up of Rocky Mountain Arsenal (June 13, 1995) (on file with author).
216. See Peters et al., supra note 212, at 10,419-20 (discussing the nature of the contami-
nation at the Arsenal).
217. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, PLUTONIUM WORKING GROUP REPORT 25 (1994).
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III. LESSONS LEARNED
A. Fines Do Not Necessarily Serve as an Incentive for Better Compliance
Behavior
At DOD and DOE federal facilities, one confronts a situation
where those responsible for remediation and compliance are not nec-
essarily those responsible for the underlying violations that have re-
sulted in contamination that now needs to be remediated. In
addition, the monetary sanctions imposed for noncompliance and
failure to meet remediation requirements are almost certain to come
directly from funds available for compliance or remediation. 18 Thus,
those responsible for remediation and compliance bear the burden of
paying a penalty for problems they often did not create. This is partic-
ularly true when the violation is of an agreement negotiated by an-
other. Even if the state imposing the fine were to specify, or Congress
were to direct, that the funds to pay a penalty come from an alterna-
tive source, the flexibility inherent in the budget building process and
the relative lack of detail in agency budgets makes it difficult to assure
that the payment of sanctions will not adversely affect a program's
budgetary requirements.219 This situation makes it unlikely that fines
and penalties will create an effective incentive for federal facility
compliance.
B. The Enforcement Agencies Having a Formal, Public Process to Use
Against Federal Facilities Is Critical to the Agencies' Success
While the amounts of the fines actually assessed and paid to date
under RCRA and CERCLA may be small, one EPA official charged
with enforcement against federal facilities suggests that there is a
more important, if unquantifiable, benefit of the RCRA and CERCLA
interagency agreement process.22 ° The benefit is that the existence of
a formal, public process for regulatory agencies to notify a federal fa-
cility of an environmental violation, which could result in monetary
sanctions, gives those agencies a tool far more effective than mere
jawboning, which is the only enforcement tool currently available
under the Clean Water Act as a result of United States Department of
Energy v. Ohio.2 2 ' The effectiveness of the RCRA and CERCLA inter-
218. See supra Part II.B.
219. See supra notes 185-197 and accompanying text.
220. Personal Communication with Barry Breen, EPA Deputy Assistant Administrator,
Office of Federal Facility Enforcement (Dec. 1994).
221. 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992). In this case, the Supreme Court held that "Congress has
not waived the National Government's sovereign immunity from liability for civil fines im-
posed by a State for past violations of the CWA." Id. at 1629. Since the waiver in § 118 of
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agency agreement process lies in its formal requirements for notice,
response and resolution."' This process, in and of itself, demands
more attention from the target facility than any informal contact or
exhoratory letter could. Moreover, because the process is public, it
leaves the target federal facility far more open to public pressure from
neighbors and activists-who may use the media-and can even gain
the attention of a local official or congressional member. Since most
federal officials do not want bad press and do not want to find them-
selves the target of a congressional inquiry, the public nature of the
process of informing a federal facility of a violation gives regulatory
agencies an effective enforcement tool.
The threat of a fine, or even the actual imposition of a fine, is not
as effective in achieving compliance as is the public exposure of non-
compliance and the requirement to commit in writing the reasons for
noncompliance. 22 EPA personnel have publicly acknowledged that it
is public exposure along with the imposition of a fine that provides
motivation to federal violators. "[E]nforcement action[s] and
penalt[ies] are a deterrent to noncompliance. They are an incentive
for federal agencies to comply with the laws of the land. That incen-
tive is not getting caught, not being exposed to the public and one's
superiors as a violator, and not being fined and reprimanded."22 14
The EPA advisory committee's experience with federal facilities
environmental restoration illuminates the importance of establishing
formal, public processes to respond to federal facilities environmental
requirements. In early 1991, the Assistant Administrator for Enforce-
ment at EPA brought together a group of individuals from DOD,
DOE, states, tribes and environmental organizations, to discuss the
setting of national priorities for clean up at federal facilities.22  At the
time, prior to the passage of the FFCA, 6 the Bush administration had
taken the position that agencies had to prioritize their environmental
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a), is identical to that in the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1323(a), the Court's decision in United States Department of Energy v. Ohio would also prob-
ably preclude states from obtaining fines and penalties from federal facilities that violate
the Clean Air Act.
222. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6937; CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9620(b)-(e).
223. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9620(c)-(e).
224. Hearings, supra note 103, at 736 (reprinting statement of Steven A. Herman, Assis-
tant Administrator, EPA, to the American Defense Preparedness Association's 20th Envi-
ronmental Symposium and Exhibit on "Department of Defense Environmental Security-
Strategies for the 21st Century").
225. FEDERAL FACILITIES ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION DIALOGUE COMMITTEE, supra note
5, at 5.
226. Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
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restoration obligations because there was not enough funding to do
all of the restoration at once. 227 Eventually, EPA turned this informal
discussion group into the Federal Facilities Environmental Restora-
tion Dialogue Committee, a formal federal advisory committee
chartered to address environmental restoration at federal facilities.22 8
In 1993, the Committee issued a report that rejected the notion of
establishing interagency and intra-agency prioritization models.229 In-
stead, the Committee made three recommendations designed to cre-
ate an open public process and dialogue between federal agencies
and other concerned stakeholders.2 3 ° The three recommendations
focused on (1) the sharing of federal facility environmental restora-
tion information, (2) the improvement of stakeholder involvement in
environmental restoration through the use of site-specific advisory
boards, and (3) the setting of priorities in the event of funding
shortfalls through the creation of a "fair share" plan for allocating
such shortfalls. These recommendations were intended to promote
trust and collaboration among all stakeholders in the environmental
restoration decision-making process.231
C. The Importance of the Attitude and Message of Agency Leadership
It appears that the extent to which a federal agency attempts to
comply with environmental requirements is as much dependent on
the agendas of the key policy-makers within the agencies as it is on any
legal obligations imposed on the agency. Thus, while the FFCA may
have influenced defense agencies' attitudes towards meaningful state
enforcement of RCRA and CERCLA, the nearly simultaneous election
of President Clinton, and the resulting change in the federal execu-
tive branch's attitude may have influenced the relationship between
the defense agencies and their state regulators more than did the
FFCA.
The attitude of Reagan and Bush administration toward environ-
mental regulations demonstrates that policies do matter. For exam-
ple, throughout the congressional battle over the FFCA, Reagan and
Bush administration officials objected to meaningful, enforceable, ex-
227. FEDERAL FACILITIES ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION DIALOGUE COMMITrEE, supra note
5, at 75-76. As a result, the Committee developed a Defense Prioritization Model for DOD
and another model for DOE, albeit one that had been highly criticized by the states and
others.
228. Id. at v.
229. Id. at v, 76.
230. Id. at v.
231. Id. at v-viii.
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ternal regulation of environmental requirements. 3 2 The message of
those who opposed the Act was not simply that state enforcement
would undeservedly enrich state coffers, but that state enforcement
would unduly interfere with federal regulatory determinations.2 3 3
The Reagan and Bush administrations also spent years fighting Colo-
rado's attempt to assert RCRA regulatory control at the Rocky Moun-
tain Arsenal, an issue which was entirely separate from the question of
Colorado's authority to assess fines and penalties for RCRA violations
at an Army Superfund site.
The executive branch's attitude toward environmental regulation
noticeably changed with the election of Presidefit Clinton. For exam-
ple, in 1993, the Secretary of Energy announced an initiative that ac-
tually would have required the Department to submit to the safety
regulations of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), even though the Atomic Energy Act allows DOE to self-regu-
late for health and safety protection. 3 5 In demonstrating a willing-
ness to go beyond the requirements of existing law, this policy
suggests that the Clinton administration's commitment to external
regulation in the health, safety, and environmental arenas is driven
not only by minimum legal requirements, but also by an attitude that
is different from that in previous administrations. Similarly, the Clin-
ton administration's proposed Superfund reform bill would have
given states direct and extensive regulatory authority in choosing
clean up standards at NPL sites. This proposal represented a com-
plete reversal of the position that the previous administrations had
championed in the Arsenal litigation.
23 6
The Clinton administration also has a very different attitude to-
ward the signing of compliance agreements than did the Bush admin-
232. See H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 103, at 30-31.
233. Id. at 1308-1313 (reprinting the dissenting views of Rep. Norman Leno).
234. See supra notes 212-216 and accompanying text.
235. See Press Release, Secretay O'Leary Announces Safety Initiative, Office of the Press Sec-
retary, Department of Energy (May 5, 1993).
236. House Bill 4916, as passed by the House Energy and Commerce Committee and
Public Works and Transportation Committee was based on an administration proposal.
One section that emerged intact after both committees' deliberations was § 207, State Role
at Federal Facilities. This section would have given states the ability to apply to the EPA
Administrator to
exercise the authorities vested in the Administrator under [section 120] at any or
all facilities owned or operated by any department, agency or instrumentality of
the United States... including the authority-
(A) to publish a timetable and deadlines for completion of any remedial
investigation and feasibility study;
(B) to review and approve all documents prepared in connection with any
such investigation and study
,
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istration. For example, John Tuck, the Bush administration's Under
Secretary of Energy, cynically acknowledged that DOE signed environ-
mental compliance agreements even when they knew did not have the
money to comply, because they needed the agreements to restart
weapons production. 37 In contrast, President Clinton's Assistant Sec-
retary for Environmental Management has repeatedly acknowledged
that, while he is committed to complying with legal obligations at the
defense complex sites, he fears that the money necessary to ensure
such compliance will not be available within the next five years.238 As
a result of this forthcoming attitude, even if the Assistant Secretary's
ultimate record of compliance is no better than that of the Bush ad-
ministration, state officials may perceive him as being honest about
the problems that his agency confronts. Such a perception will lend a
more positive tenor to the ongoing enforcement discussions and com-
pliance negotiations.23 9
Because the relationship between states and defense agencies re-
quires constant negotiations over the schedule, standards, and meth-
odology of compliance and remediation, it is necessary that states and
defense agencies have mutual trust and respect in order to minimize
friction during negotiations and to prevent the breakdown of the co-
operation that leads to enforcement.' 4 No act of Congress can legis-
late trust and respect. Thus, the personalities and attitudes of the
(C) to review and select remedies... ; and
(D) to enter into agreements with departments, agencies, and instrumentali-
ties of the United States... and to enter into consent decrees with other poten-
tially responsible parties in accordance [with this Act] ....
H.R. 4916, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 207 (1994).
237. Tuck Interview, supra note 92, at 2.
238. House Grumbly Statement, supra note 180, at 144. Ironically, it appears that both
defense agencies' problems in this arena are getting worse. New administration budget
proposals suggest additional deep cuts in environmental management at the same time
that the administration and Congress are proposing increases in defense spending. See
Mark Crawford, DOE's Defense Program Budget to Rise, ENERGY DAILY, Dec. 22, 1994, at 1;
David E. Rosenbaum, Senate Approves Proposal to Balance Budget by 2002, N.Y. TiMEs, May 26,
1995 (discussing Senate and Clinton administration agreement on a $25 billion increase in
defense spending over a seven-year period).
239. For example, DOE has cited the 1994 renegotiated Tri-Party Agreement (TPA) for
DOE's Hanford Reservation as an example of how the Department, in including stakehold-
ers in the process, has improved the compliance and trust situation at that site. See State-
ment of Thomas P. Grumbly, Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, United
States Department of Energy, to Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, House
Appropriations Committee 15-17 (Mar. 8, 1995) (DOE Fiscal Year 1996 Budget Request for
Environmental Management Program) (on file with author). For a less positive assess-
ment, see STEVEN M. BLUSH & THOMAS H. HErIMAN, TRAIN WRECK ALONG THE RIVER OF
MONEY- AN EVALUATION OF THE HANFORD CLEANUP 1-14 to 1-39 (1995).
240. FEDERAL FACILITIES ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION DIALOGUE COMMITTEE, Supra note
5, at 6-8.
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parties form a critical part of the regulatory landscape in the quest to
bring federal facilities into environmental compliance.
CONCLUSION: WHAT NEXT?
Ultimately, the key to whether federal facilities meet their compli-
ance obligations turns on whether those in power want to comply.
Thus, not only must agency decision-makers and congressional mem-
bers want federal facilities to comply with the law, but they also must
be willing to fund that compliance. Recent signals from the Clinton
administration and the 104th Congress suggest that policy-makers
faced with current fiscal realities, competing legislative priorities, and
the possibility of civil and criminal sanctions, may be preparing to
throw in the towel and abandon the concept of federally equivalent
compliance altogether.241 In testimony before Congress in March
1995, Assistant Secretary Grumbly requested a repeal of the FFCA
criminal penalty provisions. 42
In a letter to OMB's Principal Assistant Deputy for Energy and
Environment, Tom Grumbly suggested that his organization will not
be able to meet its environmental obligations with the amount of
money that OMB is proposing to request for environmental purposes
in the President's fiscal years 1996-2000 budget submittal. 24" To solve
the problem, he proposed revisiting the possibility of changing Execu-
tive Order 12,0882' and seeking numerous statutory changes
designed to reduce DOE's funding requirements. Prominent among
the changes would be modifications of DOE's compliance agreements
with the states requiring states to renegotiate DOE's milestones and
requirements annually if DOE claims it has insufficient funds to com-
ply with the agreements. 245
Implementing Mr. Grumbly's recommendations for DOE, and
for similarly situated federal agencies, however, could destroy the
modem concept of the federal government's environmental duty.
Moreover, it would likely create a firestorm of protest from the states
because of the diminishment of state power over federal action which
241. See 141 CONG. REc. S7620 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Johnston)
(introducing S. 871, a bill to allow DOE's Hanford Reservation to approach remediation
without the constraints imposed by CERCLA, RCRA, and other environmental
requirements).
242. See Senate Grumbly Statement, supra note 180, at 23.
243. Letter from Thomas Grumbly, Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management,
United States Department of Energy, to T.J. Glauthier, Associate Director for Natural Re-
sources, Energy and Science, OMB (Dec. 20, 1994) [hereinafter Grumbly Letter].
244. Exec. Order 12,088, supra note 30.
245. Grumbly Letter, supra note 243.
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would accompany these actions. In fact, states responded to
Grumbly's suggestions by condemning the administration's plans to
further reduce DOE's environmental management budget, and also
by arguing that state/DOE renegotiations over the past few years
demonstrate that current law provides sufficient flexibility for DOE.246
The Clinton administration is also considering a proposal re-
questing that congressional appropriators budget for environmental
restoration and compliance activities on a site-by-site basis, rather than
at the national program level as they have done previously.24 This
would greatly enhance the current flexibility DOE has to move money
between sites because DOE would first need to obtain congressional
approval to reprogram the funds.24 s Restructuring appropriations on
a site-by-site basis could provide DOE with a partial shield protecting it
from having to reallocate money to satisfy the demands of courts or
state regulators. However, such a change would also open the alloca-
tion of environmental funds to substantially more political maneuver-
ing; one would expect large and powerful delegations to be able to
ensure more money for their sites."
As suggested here, the passage of Superfund and the FFCA have
not, in and of themselves, led the defense agencies to comply with
environmental requirements notwithstanding the pressure created by
the formal processes of these laws. Strong countervailing forces in-
clude the influence of administrative and congressional budgetary de-
cisions and the power of individual agency decision-makers. The
proponents of the FFCA, in particular, appear to have harbored an
overly simplistic understanding of how the process of shaping the
budget might interfere with the enforcement incentives built into that
law.
A more meaningful package of incentives to encourage compli-
ance must take into account the factors that motivate the behavior of
the DOD and DOE personnel who run the systems that must comply
with environmental requirements. Just as Congress has found that a
threat to withhold federal highway funds can motivate states to pass all
kinds of laws, including ones completely unrelated to highways, there
may be things that federal agency managers want enough to motivate
246. Letter from 21 states to Hazel O'Leary (Jan. 6, 1995) (on file with author).
247. Compare National Defense Authorization Act-Fiscal Year 1995, supra note 146,
§ 3102 with Statement of Thomas P. Grumbly, supra note 239.
248. National Defense Authorization Act-Fiscal Year 1995, supra note 146, § 3121.
249. This is the same fear that drove EPA's advisory committee members to warn against
earmarking money for sites individually. FEDERAL FACILITIES ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION
DIALOGUE COMMrrTEE, supra note 5, at 50.
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their compliance with environmental regulations. However, merely
changing incentives will not be enough, because for any incentive
package to work, Congress must be willing to fund the activities neces-
sary for compliance. Since the congressional committees controlling
the budget for the defense agencies250 are not the same committees
that pass environmental laws, 51 no incentive package can equal the
commitment of the entire Congress to fund the environmental strate-
gies it adopts.
250. These committees are the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the
House National Security Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee.
251. The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee and House Energy and
Commerce Committees have jurisdiction over RCIAA and CERCLA.
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